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THE ITC IS HERE TO STAY: A DEFENSE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION’S 
ROLE IN PATENT LAW 
Linda Sun 
ABSTRACT—The International Trade Commission (ITC) is a quasi-judicial 
federal agency that is responsible for investigating unfair trade practices. 
Although the ITC is widely believed to be an expert court in patent law, it 
is often criticized for its role in the field. This Note advances a novel 
analysis of the overlooked contributions of the ITC to the development and 
enforcement of patent law. By exploring the background of the ITC, the 
procedural advantages it offers, and the ways it substantively enriches 
patent law doctrine, this Note concludes that the ITC is an important 
player in patent law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The International Trade Commission (“ITC”) is an “independent, 
nonpartisan, quasi-judicial federal agency that fulfills a range of trade-
 Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law, J.D., 2020 
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related mandates.”1 Responsible for investigating unfair trade practices and 
taking remedial action,2 it provides a venue for bringing forth a specific 
type of patent infringement complaint: a complaint alleging that the 
importation of certain products infringes a U.S. patent.3 The ITC also 
determines whether the specified imported goods infringe domestic patent 
rights and issues injunctions to prevent infringing goods from being 
imported into the United States.4 
The ITC is widely believed to be an expert court in patent law.5 This 
expertise stems from the large number of patent cases it hears.6 
Additionally, the ITC is exposed to a narrow range of technologies 
compared to district courts, which facilitates the development of technical 
expertise.7 
Despite this expertise, most scholarship in the field of patent law is 
critical of the ITC’s role in litigating patents. Some scholars argue that the 
ITC has departed from its original mission of protecting domestic industry 
and has become a patent validity court instead.8 The ITC has been called 
redundant and conflicting in the face of other venues of patent litigation, 
such as district courts.9 Additionally, the ITC has also been criticized for its 
inflexible remedies.10 To that end, it has even been suggested that the ITC 
should be abolished.11 
 1 About the USITC, UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, 
https://www.usitc.gov/press_room/about_usitc.htm [https://perma.cc/A46T-J274]. 
 2 Robert A. Caplen, Recent Trends Underscoring International Trade Commission Review of Initial 
Determinations and Federal Circuit Appeals from Final Commission Determinations under Section 337 
of the Tariff Act of 1930, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 337, 339–40 (2007). 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 David L. Schwartz, Courting Specialization: An Empirical Study of Claim Construction 
Comparing Patent Litigation Before Federal District Courts and the International Trade Commission, 
50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1699, 1702 (2009). See also Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña, Understanding the 
Federal Circuit: An Expert Community Approach, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 89, 89 (2015). 
6 Sapna Kumar, Expert Court, Expert Agency, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1547, 1590 (2011). 
 7 Id. at 1590–91. See also FY 2017 at a Glance: Intellectual Property Import Investigations, 
UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.usitc.gov/documents
/yir_op2_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/KX74-3QDV] (stating that 38% of proceedings in 2017 involved 
computer and telecommunications equipment; 13% involved pharmaceuticals and medical devices; 
10% involved automotive, transportation, and manufacturing products; 6% involved consumer 
electronics; and 33% involved other articles). 
8 See Colleen V. Chien, Patently Protectionist? An Empirical Analysis of Patent Cases at the 
International Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 63, 67–71 (2008). 
9 Id. at 71. 
 10 Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public Interest, 98 
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 5 (2012). 
11 Thomas F. Cotter, The International Trade Commission: Reform or Abolition? A Comment on 
Colleen v. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public Interest, 98 CORNELL L. 
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However, critiques of the ITC neglect its major contributions to the 
field of patent law. This Note provides an analysis of the procedural and 
substantive advantages that allow the Commission to fulfill a unique role 
in patent law. Part I of this Note provides background on the ITC and 
its processes. Part II addresses the procedural advantages of the ITC. 
Finally, Part III examines the advantages of the ITC in addressing 
substantive patent law disputes. 
I. THE ITC
The ITC is a nonpartisan federal commission responsible for 
investigating trade issues.12 The ITC “facilitates a rules-based international 
trading system” by conducting investigations on import-related issues and 
instituting remedies.13 For example, the ITC investigates allegations of 
dumping, allegations of domestic patent infringement by imported goods, 
and global safeguard cases.14 In such situations, the ITC has the power to 
implement an injunction against further imports.15 
There are six Commissioners at the ITC, each nominated by the 
President and confirmed by the Senate.16 The ITC also employs several 
administrative law judges.17 In addition, the Commission’s Office of Unfair 
Import Investigations (OUII) employs investigative attorneys.18 An 
investigative attorney is assigned to each investigation and is tasked with 
providing “‘objective’ advocacy” and “safeguard[ing] the ‘public 
interest.’”19 
REV. ONLINE 43, 54 (2013); Sapna Kumar, The Other Patent Agency: Congressional Regulation of the 
ITC, 61 FLA. L. REV. 529, 533 (2009). 
 12 About the USITC, supra note 1; U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, PUBLICATION NO. 
4744, A CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE USITC (2017) at 122, https://www.usitc.gov/publications/other
/pub4744.pdf [https://perma.cc/JN44-7XLN]. 
13 About the USITC, supra note 1. 
 14 About Import Injury Investigation, UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, 
https://www.usitc.gov/trade_remedy.htm [https://perma.cc/2L2P-JECW]. Dumping occurs when a 
foreign manufacturer sells goods in the U.S. for less than a fair value. Global safeguard cases occur 
when a U.S. industry is seriously injured by increased imports. Id. 
15 § 29:55. International Trade Commission proceedings, 5 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair 
Competition § 29:55 (5th ed.). 
 16 William P. Atkins & Justin A. Pan, An Updated Primer on Procedures and Rules in 337 
Investigations at the U.S. International Trade Commission, 18 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 105, 116 
(2010). 
17 Id. at 113–14. 
18 Id. at 116. 
19 Id. 
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A. Mission of the ITC
The self-proclaimed mission of the ITC is threefold: to “(1) administer 
U.S. trade remedy laws within its mandate in a fair and objective manner; 
(2) provide the President, [the Office of the United States Trade
Representative], and Congress with independent analysis, information, and
support on matters of tariffs, international trade, and U.S. competitiveness;
and (3) maintain the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States
(HTS).”20 Therefore, the mission of the ITC stems from international trade.
The Commission has five major operations that serve its mission. It
conducts (1) import injury investigations, (2) intellectual property-based
import investigations, (3) industry and economic analysis, (4) tariff and
trade information services, and (5) trade policy support.21 The ITC is
concerned with intellectual property and economics because of the
interplay with international trade.
B. History of the ITC
The ITC was established in 1916 as a tariff-focused organization 
called the U.S. Tariff Commission.22 It was created to be an impartial 
provider of facts and advice to Congress and the President regarding U.S. 
customs tariffs.23 The Commission collected data, compiled reports, and 
advised on the development of trade policy.24 Since then, the organization 
has evolved to focus on administering trade remedy laws that address 
international trade.25 For example, the Commission wrote a report in 1919 
regarding dumping which influenced the Antidumping Act of 1921.26 The 
Commission also contributed to the 1922 Tariff Act passed by Congress.27 
In Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, Congress gave the Commission 
direct authority to address practices in U.S. import trade.28 The purpose of 
the Tariff Act of 1930 was to “shield domestic industries from foreign 
competitors.”29 
20 About the USITC, supra note 1. 
21 Id. 
22 JOHN M. DOBSON, TWO CENTURIES OF TARIFFS: THE BACKGROUND AND EMERGENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION 1–2 (1976), available at https://www.usitc.gov
/publications/332/pub0000.pdf [https://perma.cc/MYV7-5MMJ]. 
23 A CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE USITC, supra note 12, at 122. 
24 Id. at 123. 




29 Joshua D. Furman, Reports of Section 337’s Death Have Been Greatly Exaggerated: The ITC’s 
Importance in an Evolving Patent Enforcement Environment, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 489, 490 (2015). 
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The 1974 Trade Act instituted a major change in the Commission. 
First of all, the U.S. Tariff Commission’s name was changed to what it is 
today: the U.S. International Trade Commission.30 Most significantly, the 
act “ma[d]e Section 337 proceedings before the Commission quasi-
judicial.”31 The act enabled trial-type procedures before administrative law 
judges.32 Prior to the 1974 Trade Act, the President determined whether to 
provide relief and what kind of relief was appropriate.33 Following the Act, 
the President retained the power to disapprove action taken by the ITC for 
policy reasons.34 
Since the 1974 Trade Act, investigations under Section 337 have 
increased significantly and now constitute a major part of the ITC’s 
workload.35 
C. Section 337
Section 337, codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1337, defines the manner in 
which the ITC conducts investigations.36 When a complaint is filed, the 
Commission determines whether the complaint has basis and complies with 
the ITC’s rules.37 For example, ITC complaints have a two-pronged 
domestic industry requirement: (1) economic and (2) technical.38 First, “[t]o 
satisfy the economic prong, the complainant must show that it has made 
‘substantial’ or ‘significant’ investment in domestic activities.”39 Further, 
the complainant must engage in “(A) significant investment in plant and 
equipment: (B) significant employment of labor or capital: or (C) 
substantial investment in its exploitation, including engineering, research 
and development, or licensing.”40 Second, in regards to the technical prong, 
the complainant “must show that it has a domestic product that practices at 
least one claim of the asserted patent.”41 
Once a complaint has been filed, the six Commissioners vote on 
whether to institute an investigation.42 If an investigation is opened, an 
30 DOBSON, supra note 22, at 1–2. 




35 Id. at 133. 
36 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2004). 
37 Atkins & Pan, supra note 16, at 112. 
38 Furman, supra note 29, at 493–94. 
39 Id. at 494. 
40 19 U.S.C. § 1337. 
41 Furman, supra note 29, at 494. 
42 Atkins & Pan, supra note 16, at 112. 
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administrative law judge is assigned to preside over the case in a role 
similar to that of a district court judge.43 The administrative law judge 
issues initial determinations on matters such as whether there is a Section 
337 violation and recommended remedies.44 
The ITC cannot impose damages, but it has a variety of injunctive 
remedies available.45 The ITC has the option to choose which products to 
ban and the timing of the ban.46 For example, the ITC can issue general 
exclusion orders, importation bans of all articles found to violate section 
337, limited exclusion orders aimed only at the infringing products of the 
named respondents, temporary exclusion orders which operate during the 
pendency of the investigation, and both temporary and permanent cease 
and desist orders.47 
Initial determinations become final determinations unless the 
Commission votes to review them.48 ITC final determinations then undergo 
a sixty-day Presidential review period.49 During the review period, 
continued importation may be permitted based upon payment of a bond set 
by the ITC.50 The President can disapprove of any ITC order for policy 
reasons.51 However, Presidential reversal of an ITC reversal is 
exceptionally rare.52 ITC decisions may be appealed to the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit.53 
II. PROCEDURAL ADVANTAGES OF THE ITC
Through its “jurisdiction, remedies, and speed,” the ITC fills a void 
left in patent law by district courts.54 When district courts are not a viable 
43 Id. at 113–115. 
 44 Id. at 115; See David Long, ITC to consider ALJ’s decision and recommended exclusion order 
on alleged SEPs that ALJ found were not essential to the LTO-7 standard (337-TA-1012 Fujifilm v. 
Sony), ESSENTIAL PATENT BLOG (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.essentialpatentblog.com/2017/12/itc-
consider-aljs-decision-recommended-exclusion-order-alleged-seps-alj-found-not-essential-lto-7-
standard-337-ta-1012-fujitsu-v-sony/ [https://perma.cc/6WQ7-CRQD]. 
45 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2004). 
46 Chien & Lemley, supra note 10, at 32. 
47 19 U.S.C. § 1337. 
48 Atkins & Pan, supra note 16, at 114. 
49 Id. at 135. 
50 Chien & Lemley, supra note 10, at 32. 
51 Id. at 31. 
52 The two most recent reversals happened in 2013, under President Obama, and in 1987, under 
President Reagan. The International Trade Commission: easier injunctive relief-except for Standard-
Essential Patent holders, LEXOLOGY, https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=faebe6bc-bc5a-
4108-90f7-ddaf228eb2be [https://perma.cc/5A52-F88V]. 
53 Chien & Lemley, supra note 10, at 32. 
54 Chien, supra note 8, at 94. 
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option due to high litigation costs, long timelines, lack of jurisdiction, or 
inadequate remedies, the procedural advantages of the ITC help patent 
holders safeguard their biggest investments. In a study of Section 337 cases 
between 1995 and 2000, Section 337 cases were found to generally involve 
valuable patents.55 The patents were more recent and had “more forward 
citations, claims, and related patents abroad than did patents litigated in 
federal district courts.”56 In addition, for import-heavy fields such as the 
electronics industry, the ITC is uniquely capable of providing effective 
remedies. 57 
A. Jurisdiction
The jurisdiction of the ITC allows it to address needs in patent law 
and trade. The ITC has unique features that enable prosecution of foreign 
infringers who would otherwise escape U.S. district courts.58 Foreign 
defendants can take advantage of two scenarios that impede the judicial 
enforcement of patent rights in domestic courts: (1) where the court lacks 
personal jurisdiction over the infringer, and (2) where the identity of the 
foreign manufacturer is unknown and legal recourse is unlikely.59 The ITC 
closes these loopholes and puts foreign defendants on notice of U.S. patent 
rights. 
The ITC has “in rem” jurisdiction, which arises from the importation 
of products.60 Thus, jurisdiction over foreign companies is easy to obtain as 
long as the foreign companies are importing products.61 In addition, the 
55 Id. at 81. 
 56 Id. See also Catherine Y. Co, How Valuable are the Patents Behind Section 337 Cases?, 27 
WORLD ECON. 525, 529–32 (2004) (claiming that the number of forward citations, patent claims, and 
related patents abroad may be indicators of patent value); John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 
GEO. L.J. 435, 438 (2004) (stating that valuable patents tend to be young, are more likely to be cited, 
and contain more claims than ordinary patents). But see David S. Abrams & Bhaven N. Sampat, What’s 
the Value of Patent Citations? Evidence from Pharmaceuticals (Preliminary Draft) (2017) (concluding 
that citations to drug patents are weakly related to the value of the patents), 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/research-faculty/clbe/events/innovation/documents
/AbramsSampatDrugCites060917.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZL75-9Z8S]. 
57 Christopher A. Cotropia, Strength of the International Trade Commission As A Patent Venue, 20 
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 5 (2011) (stating that in the electronics industry, most products containing 
patented technology are manufactured abroad and imported into the United States). 
 58 Colleen V. Chien & David L. Schwartz, Empirical Studies of the International Trade 
Commission, in 2 RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 175, 
175 (Peter S. Menell & David L. Schwartz eds., 2019) [hereinafter Empirical Studies]. 
 59 K. William Watson, Still a Protectionist Trade Remedy: The Case for Repealing Section 337, 
708 CATO INST. POL’Y ANALYSIS 1, 8 (2012). 
60 Atkins & Pan, supra note 16, at 110. 
 61 See Empirical Studies, supra note 58, at 177. With in rem jurisdiction over accused imports, 
personal jurisdiction over accused respondents does not need to be established. Moreover, in rem 
jurisdiction allows a complainant to bring a single action against multiple respondents located in 
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Commission has nationwide personal jurisdiction.62 In contrast, venue and 
personal jurisdiction rules in district courts may deny standing in the same 
cases.63 The ITC’s expansive jurisdiction may be one reason some patent 
holders engage in ITC litigation even when they have a parallel case in 
district courts: ITC litigation enables them to capture foreign entities.64 
B. Lack of Jury in ITC Section 337 Proceedings
In district courts, the jury is responsible for determining infringement 
and remedies; however, jury verdicts are “often unpredictable and 
inconsistent”.65 Most juries do not understand patent law or the 
technologies that are litigated.66 Juries can be influenced by brand loyalty 
and are often compelled by storytelling.67 This level of uncertainty is 
socially inefficient and cuts against utilitarian justifications of patent law.68 
For example, even an insignificant patent could command a high settlement 
from defendants afraid of gambling on a jury’s decision.69 In fact, federal 
judges have advocated for eliminating juries from patent cases.70 
In contrast, ITC proceedings do not involve juries. Infringement and 
remedies are determined by an administrative law judge who is 
experienced in patent law. The proceedings are aided by staff attorneys 
different jurisdictions. For example, in a recent Section 337 investigation, the complaint named 25 
respondents from seven states and five countries. Russel E. Levine, The Benefits of Using the ITC, 
MANAGING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, Sept. 2004, at 25, 28, https://www.kirkland.com/siteFiles
/kirkexp/publications/2386/Document1/Levine_MIP.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZTT6-9VA9]. 
62 Atkins & Pan, supra note 16, at 110. 
63 Cotropia, supra note 57, at 5. 
64 In one study of cases that were filed both in the ITC and district courts, “while 85% of the ITC 
cases named at least one foreign respondent, only 67% of district court cases did.” Chien, supra note 8, 
at 93–94. 
 65 Joel C. Johnson, Lay Jurors in Patent Litigation: Reviving the Active, Inquisitorial Model for 
Juror Participation, 5 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 339, 340 (2004). 
 66 Michael A. Fisher, Going for the Blue Ribbon: The Legality of Expert Juries in Patent Litigation, 
2 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 1 (2001). 
 67 Jeff Roberts, 3 reasons juries have no place in the patent system, GIGAOM (Aug. 27, 2012), 
https://gigaom.com/2012/08/27/3-reasons-juries-have-no-place-in-the-patent-system/ 
[https://perma.cc/3DLZ-SD7K]. 
 68 The historic justifications behind our patent system are utilitarian. The theory is that patents 
should provide enough property rights to help recoup costs of invention, therefore incentivizing 
innovation for the greater public. David S. Olsen, Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law 
Seriously: The Case for Restricting Patentable Subject Matter, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 181, 183 (2009). 
69 Chien & Lemley, supra note 10, at 8. 
 70 Richard A. Posner, Why There Are Too Many Patents in America, THE ATLANTIC, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/07/why-there-are-too-many-patents-in-
america/259725/#.T_7jUH2JTJg.facebook [https://perma.cc/3Z5J-628A]. However, some litigators 
note that trial judges who have no technical background or exposure to patent law are no better than a 
jury. Jennifer F. Miller, Should Juries Hear Complex Patent Cases?, 4 DUKE L. & TECH. REV., 1, 33 
(2004). 
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who also have patent law expertise. While certain positive aspects of jury 
trials would be lost, the net benefit of an expert fact-finder outweighs the 
losses.71 
C. Speediness of ITC Section 337 Proceedings
ITC proceedings are typically much faster than district court 
proceedings. In fact, the ITC is known as the “fastest patent court in the 
country.”72 The average Section 337 investigation in 2008 was roughly one 
year and four months, whereas the average for the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Columbia was three years and eight months.73 
The need for speed is stated in Section 337 itself: Investigations are 
required to conclude “at the earliest practicable time.”74 The Commission 
must establish a target date for completion of the investigation in order to 
“promote expeditious adjudication.”75 The administrative law judge 
assigned to the case must issue an initial determination on the issues no less 
than four months before the target date.76 
Due to these time constraints, ITC proceedings generally do not offer 
stays for inter partes review proceedings, whereas district court 
proceedings do so more often.77 In addition, counterclaims filed in ITC 
investigations are automatically removed to a district court.78 Both of these 
factors hasten ITC proceedings. 
The speedy nature of Section 337 proceedings is due to the 
Commission’s mission of regulating trade.79 Waiting years to provide 
injunctive relief, which is typical of district courts, “may be too long to 
 71 See Philippe Signore, On the Role of Juries in Patent Litigation (Part 1), 83 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 791, 825 (2001) (stating advantages of jury trials, such as fostering 
democratic participation, reducing the probability for bias, and a relatively quick verdict). 
72 Schwartz, supra note 5, at 1724. 
73 Atkins & Pan, supra note 16, at 129. 
74 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2004). 
75 Id. 
76 Empirical Studies, supra note 58, at 179. 
77 Id. An ITC case will typically finish more quickly than an inter partes review (IPR) proceeding. 
Eric J. Fues, The Interplay Between the ITC and PTAB—More Progress Needed, BLOOMBERG LAW 
(2019), https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/the-interplay-between-the-itc-and-the-ptabmore-
progress-needed.html [https://perma.cc/86Q8-ATEA]. However, a final written decision reached in an 
IPR could heavily impact the ITC’s decision. In 2018, for the first time, the ITC stayed a violation-
phase Section 337 investigation based on an IPR final written decision. There were unusual 
circumstances that caused the ITC investigation schedule to be pushed behind the IPR schedule. 
February 2019: ITC Treatment of IPR Decisions, QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP 
(March 2, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/february-2019-itc-treatment-of-ipr-65955/ 
[https://perma.cc/UZ44-8NGM]. 
78 Chien, supra note 8, at 77. 
79 Furman, supra note 29, at 525. 
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effectively protect domestic industries.”80 While critics argue that the ITC 
does not protect domestic industries against foreign competitors because 
many cases involve domestic defendants, the domestic defendants in 
question actually engage in manufacturing abroad and then import to the 
United States.81 By allowing a claim to be filed against a domestic entity, 
the ITC prevents foreign competitors from escaping scrutiny by acquiring a 
U.S. subsidiary. 
D. Remedies Available at the ITC
Under Section 337, the ITC is limited to injunctive remedies and 
cannot award damages.82 This simplifies remedy calculations. Generally, 
damage calculations are very difficult and frequently require economic 
experts to determine a fair monetary remedy. 
District courts can also award injunctions. However, district courts 
must balance common law considerations and apply the four-factor eBay 
test when awarding injunctions.83 This is a complex process that can result 
in increased litigation costs. In contrast, the ITC is not bound by this test.84 
The ITC is free to award injunctions whenever infringement is found. 
In fact, that is largely what the ITC does. Injunctions are almost 
always issued after a finding of infringement, further simplifying remedy 
determinations.85 Prevailing patentees are “essentially guaranteed” to be 
granted injunctions in the ITC, whereas injunctions are less common in 
district courts.86 
The ITC’s issuance of injunctions has been accused of causing patent 
holdups.87 Specifically, the ITC has been criticized for providing a venue 
where patent assertion entities and patent trolls can run free, unchecked by 
80 Id. 
81 Chien, supra note 8, at 89. 
82 Atkins & Pan, supra note 16, at 111. 
83 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (“A plaintiff must demonstrate: 
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary
damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships
between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest
would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.”). 
84 Chien, supra note 8, at 109. 
85 Cotropia, supra note 57, at 6. 
86 Chien, supra note 8, at 99. 
87 See J. Gregory Sidak, International Trade Commission Exclusion Orders for the Infringement of 
Standard-Essential Patents, 26 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 125, 145–46 (2016). A patent holdup 
occurs when a patent holder requests more than reasonable royalties because it can hold the threat of an 
injunction over the other party’s head. J. Gregory Sidak, Holdup, Royalty Stacking, and the 
Presumption of Injunctive Relief for Patent Infringement: A Reply to Lemley and Shapiro, 92 MINN. L. 
REV. 714, 714 (2008). 
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eBay.88 However, without the ITC’s remedy of injunctions, reverse holdup 
could be facilitated.89 More importantly, the ITC has dealt with the problem 
of patent assertion entities by changing other policies, therefore preserving 
the benefits of providing only injunctions as remedies. For instance, the 
ITC modified its requirements for Section 337 proceedings multiple times 
to limit participation by patent assertion entities.90 
The ITC can also grant general exclusion orders, “a special remedy 
available only in the ITC that excludes infringing items regardless of 
source.”91 A general exclusion order allows a patent holder to simply block 
infringers without having to file separate complaints against various 
manufacturers and chase down infringers who open up shops under 
different names.92 This remedy sweeps away legal steps required by district 
courts. 
ITC determinations regarding remedies are also difficult to reverse.93 
The Federal Circuit reverses the ITC’s remedies only when they are 
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law.”94 This is a high bar that is difficult to surpass. Patent 
holders can have confidence in remedies given by the ITC and competitors 
are put on notice, with the caveat that the Federal Circuit applies a more 
stringent standard of review to substantive patent law determinations made 
by the ITC.95 
III. SUBSTANTIVE ADVANTAGES OF THE ITC
The ITC substantively contributes to the field of patent law by 
providing valuable perspectives that are percolated up the courts; in 
particular, the ITC provides a multidisciplinary view of patent law by 
 88 COLLEEN V. CHIEN, THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION AND PATENT DISPUTES 3 (2012), 
available at http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1437&context=facpubs 
[https://perma.cc/J5CQ-YHB6]. 
 89 Sidak, International Trade Commission Exclusion Orders for the Infringement of Standard-
Essential Patents, supra note 87, at 150. Reverse hold-ups occur when patent holders are under-
compensated for the value of their innovation. Damien Geradin, Reverse Hold-Ups: The (Often 
Ignored) Risks Faced By Innovators In Standardized Areas, in SWEDISH COMPETITION AUTHORITY, 
THE PROS AND CONS OF STANDARD SETTING, 101, 104 (2010), available at 
http://www.konkurrensverket.se/globalassets/english/research/read-the-book-14mb.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ATN9-HVTX]. 
 90 Josh Landau, International Trade, Not Interrupted Trade - Trolls and the ITC, PATENT
PROGRESS (June 30, 2017), https://www.patentprogress.org/2017/06/30/trolls-itc 
[https://perma.cc/Q8V9-V8ZV]; Furman, supra note 29, at 528–29. 
91 Empirical Studies, supra note 58, at 177. 
92 Empirical Studies, supra note 58, at 177. 
93 Chien & Lemley, supra note 10, at 31. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
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incorporating trade considerations.96 Percolation is usually discussed in the 
context of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court is responsible for 
“[r]econciling discrepancies in the law and filling voids in doctrine.”97 The 
Supreme Court is able to make a more informed decision on a legal issue 
that is “well-percolated,” meaning multiple lower courts have weighed in.98 
Typically, this is by way of the various regional circuit courts of appeals. 
However, the Federal Circuit hears all patent appeals.99 Therefore, in the 
context of patent law, the Federal Circuit can also be considered a top 
decision maker that benefits from the percolation of legal issues.100 
The Federal Circuit hears appeals from patent cases originating in 
district courts, the ITC, and the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB). In 
an area of law that lacks uncoordinated review by regional circuits of 
appeals, the separate patent litigation venues can “encourage [examination] 
and [criticism of] each other’s decisions, which . . . can generate solutions 
that are not obvious on a first or second look.”101 In addition, the district 
courts, ITC, and PTAB can “experiment with different legal rules” which 
provides the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court with “concrete information 
about the consequences of various options.”102 
A system without percolation creates a risk of locking the law into one 
mode of operation.103 It can result in “excessive uniformity, losing the 
useful debate . . . that leads to evolution of patent legal theory.”104 
Specialized judges may be subject to “tunnel vision” or be overly 
influenced by special interest groups.105 The ITC provides viewpoints on 
patent law that the district courts and PTAB do not offer. 
 96 Pedraza, supra note 5, at 141 (arguing that patent law should incorporate multiple types of 
expertise). 
 97 Tom S. Clark & Jonathan P. Kastellec, The Supreme Court and Percolation in the Lower Courts: 
An Optimal Stopping Model, 75 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS 150, 152 (2013). 
98 Id. 
 99 Court Jurisdiction, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, 
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/the-court/court-jurisdiction [https://perma.cc/U6GP-SKFH]. 
100 See John M. Golden, The Supreme Court As “Prime Percolator”: A Prescription for Appellate 
Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657, 703 (2009). 
101 Id. at 701. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Holly Lance, Not So Technical: An Analysis of Federal Circuit Patent Decisions Appealed from 
the ITC, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 243, 247 (2010). 
105 Golden, supra note100, at 674; see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, 
In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal Circuit Comes of Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787, 
802–03 (2008) (cautioning that the Federal Circuit has made the law more precise at the expense of 
quality). 
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A. The ITC as a Patent Specialized Court
The ITC provides a unique patent-specialized trial court perspective 
on patent law that is percolated to the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court. 
In a highly technical area of law such as patent law, an understanding 
of the science and technology behind the patents at issue can be critical to 
making a fair and correct ruling.106 Specialized intellectual property courts 
may be “better equipped to keep pace with and adapt to dynamic 
developments in [intellectual property] law,” and can develop rules that are 
tailored to intellectual property disputes.107 Specialized judges would 
become more proficient in patent law, which would “likely reduce the cost 
and length” of trials.108 For these reasons, many industrial nations have 
specialized patent trial courts or panels.109 For example, Japan has 
specialized divisions of district and appeals courts that handle intellectual 
property matters.110 Greece staffs their Specialized Intellectual Property 
Right Divisions with judges with expertise in intellectual property rights.111 
A 2012 study on specialized intellectual property courts conducted by the 
International Intellectual Property Institute and the USPTO found that 
specialized intellectual property courts “often make quicker and more 
effective decisions.”112 
The ITC can be viewed as a patent-specialized trial court because of 
its similarities to specialized trial courts: almost all of the ITC’s cases are 
patent infringement violations.113 Although the administrative law judges of 
the ITC have a variety of backgrounds, they “acquire extensive experience 
in patent law and are widely regarded as experts.”114 While the PTAB is 
also patent-specialized, it is more limited than the ITC in the type of issues 
 106 Study on Specialized Intellectual Property Courts, INT’L INTELL. PROP. INST. & U.S. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. 5–6 (Jan. 25, 2012), https://iipi.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Study-on-
Specialized-IPR-Courts.pdf [https://perma.cc/YB95-3MCA]. 
 107 Jacques de Werra, A Closer Look at Specialized Intellectual Property Courts, WORLD INTELL.
PROP. ORG. (Nov. 2016), http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2016/si/article_0009.html 
[https://perma.cc/X3G6-QAQU]. 
 108 Gregory J. Wallace, Toward Certainty and Uniformity in Patent Infringement Cases after Festo 
and Markman: A Proposal for a Specialized Patent Trial Court with a Rule of Greater Deference, 77 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1383, 1414 (2004). 
109 Id. at 1410. 
110 Study on Specialized Intellectual Property Courts, supra note 106, at 4. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 5. 
113 Lance, supra note 104, at 245, 249. 
114 Kumar, supra note 6, at 1555. 
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it can hear.115 The presence of the ITC provides the benefits of a patent-
specialized court within the larger framework of percolation. 
B. The ITC Provides a Trade and Policy Perspective
With its basis in international trade regulation, the ITC puts a policy 
and trade lens on patent law. By being a part of the large patent law 
landscape, the ITC allows views of patent law influenced by public policy 
and trade to percolate. This broadens how decisions are made and 
decreases the chance of a “tunnel vision” view of patent law.116 
Congress specifically instructed the ITC to consider the public policy 
of promoting free competition, which “suggests that Congress wanted the 
ITC to use a nuanced approach in determining patent validity and 
enforceability, with a focus on protecting U.S. businesses from the negative 
side-effects of free trade.”117 The ITC has unique trade expertise; the 
agency investigates trade issues from dumping to tariffs and possesses 
broad knowledge about trade practices that harm U.S. companies.118 This 
broad base of information is utilized by the ITC in its determinations of 
patent validity and remedies. In fact, the law requires the ITC to utilize this 
information. For example, before implementing an exclusion order, the ITC 
is required to consider whether the exclusion order is “inconsistent with the 
public interest, with input from other regulatory agencies.”119 The ITC is 
also able to order public hearings to determine whether such exclusion 
orders would harm the public.120 In contrast, district courts are not equipped 
or required to consider issues of trade and foreign policy.121 
A unique element of Section 337 proceedings is the participation of an 
investigative attorney (or “staff attorney”) from the Office of Unfair Import 
Investigations.122 Each proceeding has a staff attorney who “participates in 
discovery, motions, and trial, creating a different case dynamic than that 
experienced in district court.”123 The staff attorney is a full party to the 
investigation and “functions as an independent litigant representing the 
 115 The PTAB can only hear patent validity issues under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 or 103 wherein patents 
or printed publications are relied on. 37 C.F.R. §42.104 (2019). 
116 See Kumar, supra note 6, at 1602. 
117 H.R. Rep. No. 93–571 (1973), at 78; Kumar, supra note 6, at 1591. 
118 Kumar, supra note 6, at 1591. 
119 Empirical Studies, supra note 58, at 180. 
120 Kumar, supra note 6, at 1595. 
121 Id. at 1591–92. 
122 Id. at 1595. 
123 Chien, supra note 8, at 79–80. 
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public interest.”124 The addition of a neutral party who advocates for free 
trade adds a unique perspective to ITC proceedings. 
In addition, the President has the authority to veto injunctions issued 
under Section 337 proceedings based on policy reasons.125 These policy 
reasons include: “(1) public health and welfare; (2) competitive conditions 
in the U.S. economy; (3) production of competitive articles in the United 
States; (4) U.S. consumers; and (5) U.S. foreign relations, economic and 
political.”126 The President’s decision cannot be appealed to the Federal 
Circuit.127 The fact that the President can veto ITC decisions makes the ITC 
a better-positioned forum to make policy decisions as compared to district 
courts, which are not under the executive branch’s purview.128 Therefore, 
the ITC is able to incorporate more policy considerations into its patent 
cases without the same decision costs of district courts. At times, a 
Presidential veto results in a narrowed or altered remedy from the ITC.129 
Incorporating the President’s point of view adds another dimension to ITC 
patent decisions that sets them apart from district court decisions. Thus, the 
ITC adds diversity and important public interest considerations to the body 
of patent law doctrine that informs the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court. 
C. Flexibility of the ITC
The ITC and its processes have been substantively amended since the 
ITC’s inception. With each change, the ITC has become better suited to 
address patent issues. The flexibility of the ITC contributes to its important 
presence in the patent law landscape. 
Prior to the 1980’s, a patent holder had to show both infringement and 
economic injury to a domestic industry in order to qualify for a Section 337 
investigation.130 This meant universities and small companies were 
excluded from ITC proceedings because they did not engage in 
manufacturing.131 In response, Congress passed the 1988 Omnibus Trade 
and Competitiveness Act that relaxed the domestic industry and injury 
124 JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS III ET AL., PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 21:47 (2d ed. 2019). 
125 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2004). 
126 Landon J. Greene, Alternate Reality: Limiting the Scope of Presidential Authority Under § 337, 
24 FED. CIR. B.J. 111, 112 (2014). 
127 Id. 
128 Kumar, supra note 6, at 1594. 
129 See Presidential Disapproval of a Section 337 Determination, 52 Fed. Reg. 46,011, 46,011–12 
(Dec. 3, 1987). 
130 Furman, supra note 29, at 497. 
131 See id. at 497–98. 
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requirements.132 Section 337 was amended to no longer require injury and 
to consider licensing as a form of industry.133 
In response to a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
ruling that found Section 337 to violate international law, Congress 
changed Section 337 to loosen time limits, allow counterclaims, allow stays 
of district court litigation, and increase requirements for general exclusion 
orders in 1994.134 This allowed the ITC to provide general exclusion orders 
when warranted while easing GATT concerns over the differences between 
district court and ITC remedies.135 
The eBay injunction standard addressed the problem of patent 
assertion entity or patent troll claims in district courts.136 However, applying 
eBay to the ITC would make the ITC redundant and leave it unable to 
appropriately address unfair trade practices.137 Instead, the ITC used a 
“more trade forum-appropriate lever.”138 In 2014, the ITC tightened its 
domestic industry standards, which reduced the number of patent assertion 
entities filing Section 337 cases.139 The Commission reversed decades of 
practice, ruling that to fulfill the domestic industry requirement based on 
licensing, a complainant must produce an article that practices the asserted 
patent.140 Further, the Commission held that to fulfill the domestic industry 
requirement based on research and development activities, a complainant 
must prove that there is a nexus between the U.S. based research and 
development and the asserted patent.141 In response, patent assertion entities 
started to work around the new domestic industry standards: they would 
sue a company, settle, provide a license to the company, and then subpoena 
the company to provide documentation in the Section 337 proceeding to 
show the patent assertion entity satisfies the domestic industry requirement. 
In response, Congress has introduced the “Trade Protection, Not Troll 
132 Id. at 498–99. 
 133 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 100–418 §1342, 102 Stat. 
1107 (1988). 
134 Chien, supra note 8, at 77 (quoting Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103–465, 
§ 321, 108 Stat. 4809 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1659 (1995))). 
135 Furman, supra note 29, at 502. 
 136 Leslie T. Grab, Equitable Concerns of Ebay v. Mercexchange: Did the Supreme Court 
Successfully Balance Patent Protection Against Patent Trolls?, 8 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 81, 82 (2006). 
137 Furman, supra note 29, at 528–29. 
138 Id. at 528. 
139 Landau, supra note 90; Furman, supra note 29, at 528. 
140 Certain Computers and Computer Peripheral Devices, Inv. No. 337-TA-841, Comm’n Op. at 40 
(U.S.I.T.C., 2014). 
141 Certain Integrated Circuit Chips, Inv. No. 337-TA-859, Comm’n Op. at 38 (U.S.I.T.C., 2014). 
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Protection” bill.142 The bill tightens the domestic industry requirement again 
such that any licensing must lead to a product; licensing that happens after 
a product already exists is not sufficient.143 In addition, any licensees who 
provide proof of domestic industry must join the ITC case voluntarily, 
preventing the “domestic industry by subpoena” problem.144 In sum, the 
ITC has proven through its history that it has the ability to adapt to an 
evolving patent landscape. 
CONCLUSION 
Critics overlook the pro-utilitarian aspects of the ITC as a patent 
litigation venue. The jurisdiction, lack of jury, fast proceedings, and 
remedies provided by the Commission protect incentives for innovation. In 
addition, the ITC provides important patent-specialized and trade-focused 
viewpoints that add to the development of substantive patent law doctrine. 
Overall, the procedural and substantive advantages of the Commission 
establish it as an important player in U.S. patent law. As long as it 
continues to be flexible and react appropriately to changes in patent law, 
the ITC is here to stay. 
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